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Secure Quantum Secret Sharing Based on Reusable GHZ States
as Secure Carriers
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We show a potential eavesdropper can eavesdrop whole secret information when
the legitimate users use secure carrier to encode and decode classical information
repeatedly in the protocol [proposed in Bagherinezhad S and Karimipour V 2003
Phys. Rev. A 67 044302]. Then we present a revised quantum secret sharing
protocol by using Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state as secure carrier. Our protocol
can resist Eve’s attack.
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Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is a generalization of classical secret sharing to a quan-
tum scenario. The basic idea of QSS is: After Alice distributes her secret message to the
receivers (Bob, Charlie, . . . ), all the receivers can obtain the secret message simultaneously
by collaboration. Since Hillery et al. [1] proposed the pioneering QSS work, QSS has at-
tracted a widespread attention and progressed quickly [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] over the past
several years. In 2001, Guo et al. [10] proposed a quantum key distribution protocol by
using quantum key to encode and decode classical information. The quantum key can be
used repeatedly. Based on Guo’s protocol, Karimipour et al. [11] proposed a QSS protocol
by using Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states as secure carriers.
Recently, Gao et al. [12] present an eavesdropping protocol by which Eve can obtain
odd numbered data bits of Karimipour’s protocol [11]. Karimipour [13] shows that the
quantum bits in odd rounds can be discarded by legitimate users. Only if Eve can get the
whole information, this protocol can be proved insecure. In this paper, we propose another
eavesdropping method to the protocol in Ref. [11]. Eve can get the whole information
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2without being detected by the legitimate users. Then we present a revised QSS protocol
by using GHZ state to encode and decode classical information. Our QSS protocol can be
robust against Eve’s attack.
First of all, let us give a brief review of Karimipour’s protocol [11]. In the beginning, Alice,
Bob and Charlie have shared a GHZ state |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 1〉)a,b,c as carrier (used
subscripts a, b and c on the states and operators for Alice, Bob and Charlie, respectively),
and the data bits Alice wants to distributed to Bob and Charlie can be represented by
q1, q3, q5, · · · (where q = 0 or 1) in odd round and q2, q4, q6, · · · (where q → q¯ = |q〉12 =
1√
2
{|0, q〉+ |1, q ⊕ 1〉} and “⊕” is performed modulo 2) in even round. In odd round, Alice
entangles the state |q, q〉1,2 to the carrier by performing controlled-NOT (CNOT) operations
Ca1, Ca2 and send them to Bob and Charlie (Ca1 is the controlled-NOT gate and is specified
by two subscripts, the first one is the control bit, the second one is the target bit). Bob and
Charlie act on this state by the operations Cb1, Cc2 to read independently his own bit. In
even round, Alice performs Ca1 to entangle the state |q〉12 to the carrier. Bob and Charlie
disentangle the state |q〉12 from the carrier by the operations Cb1, Cc2. Bob and Charlie can
gain Alice’s information by collaboration. Now let us describe our eavesdropping strategy
to eavesdrop the whole information of [11]. Eve prepares two qubits (e1 and e2) in state |0〉
as her two ancilla.
(1) In the first round, according to the method in Ref. [12], Eve intercepts the first
sending qubit which is denoted by subscript 1, and then performs a controlled-NOT (CNOT)
operation C1e1 on this qubit and her ancilla after Alice sent the particles. This state of these
qubits can be specified by
|ψ1〉 =


1√
2
(|0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1〉)a,b,c,e1,1,2 (q1 = 0),
1√
2
(|0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1〉+ |1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0〉)a,b,c,e1,1,2 (q1 = 1),
(1)
and then Eve resends it to Bob. Here superscript 1 denotes the first round. The value of qn
denotes Alice’s sending information. Bob and Charlie can get the right information when
they disentangle the sending qubit from the carrier.
(2) In the second round, as Alice, Bob and Charlie perform a Hadamard gate on their
particles, respectively, Eve also performs the same operation on his ancilla e1. After Alice
entangles the entangled state q2 to the carrier, she sends the two particles (1 and 2) to Bob
and Charlie, then Eve intercepts the two sent qubits and performs two CNOT operations
3C1e2 , C2e2. The qubit e2 is also entangled to the carrier. Eve performs a CNOT operation
Ce11. She resends them to Bob and Charlie. After Bob and Charlie performed two CNOT
operations Cb1, Cc2 to disentangle their receiving particles from the carrier and measured
the qubits 1 and 2, they cooperate to get the value of q2 and can’t detect the presence of
Eve, while leaving the state
|ψ2〉 →


1
2
√
2
(|0, 0, 0, 0, 0〉+ |0, 0, 1, 1, 0〉+ |0, 1, 0, 1, 0〉+ |0, 1, 1, 0, 0〉+ |1, 0, 0, 1, 1〉
+ |1, 0, 1, 0, 1〉+ |1, 1, 0, 0, 1〉+ |1, 1, 1, 1, 1〉)a,b,c,e1,e2 (q2 = 0, q1 = 0),
1
2
√
2
(|0, 0, 0, 0, 1〉+ |0, 0, 1, 1, 1〉+ |0, 1, 0, 1, 1〉+ |0, 1, 1, 0, 1〉+ |1, 0, 0, 1, 0〉
+ |1, 0, 1, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 0, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 1, 1, 0〉)a,b,c,e1,e2 (q2 = 1, q1 = 0),
1
2
√
2
(|0, 0, 0, 0, 0〉 − |0, 0, 1, 1, 0〉 − |0, 1, 0, 1, 0〉+ |0, 1, 1, 0, 0〉 − |1, 0, 0, 1, 1〉
+ |1, 0, 1, 0, 1〉+ |1, 1, 0, 0, 1〉 − |1, 1, 1, 1, 1〉)a,b,c,e1,e2 (q2 = 0, q1 = 1),
1
2
√
2
(|0, 0, 0, 0, 1〉 − |0, 0, 1, 1, 1〉 − |0, 1, 0, 1, 1〉+ |0, 1, 1, 0, 1〉 − |1, 0, 0, 1, 0〉
+ |1, 0, 1, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 0, 0, 0〉 − |1, 1, 1, 1, 0〉)a,b,c,e1,e2 (q2 = 1, q1 = 1).
(2)
(3) In the third round, Eve can eavesdrop the odd round’s key bit. Firstly, Eve also
performs a Hadamard gate on each of her two ancilla, when Alice, Bob and Charlie perform
a Hadamard gate on their respective particles. The state of Alice, Bob, Charlie and Eve can
be expressed as
|ψ3〉 →


1
2
(|0, 0, 0, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 1, 1, 0〉+ |1, 0, 0, 0, 1〉+ |0, 1, 1, 1, 1〉)a,b,c,e1,e2 (q1 = 0, q2 = 0),
1
2
(|0, 0, 0, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 1, 1, 0〉 − |1, 0, 0, 0, 1〉 − |0, 1, 1, 1, 1〉)a,b,c,e1,e2 (q1 = 0, q2 = 1),
1
2
(|1, 1, 1, 0, 0〉+ |0, 0, 0, 1, 0〉+ |0, 1, 1, 0, 1〉+ |1, 0, 0, 1, 1〉)a,b,c,e1,e2 (q1 = 1, q2 = 0),
1
2
(|1, 1, 1, 0, 0〉+ |0, 0, 0, 1, 0〉 − |0, 1, 1, 0, 1〉 − |1, 0, 0, 1, 1〉)a,b,c,e1,e2 (q1 = 1, q2 = 1),
(3)
4After Alice sent out the two qubits, Eve intercepts the two qubits and performs four CNOT
operations Ce11, Ce21 and Ce12, Ce22. Eve makes a measurement on one of two qubits (1
and 2) and gets the value of q3 ⊕ q1. After Eve performs Ce11 and Ce12, she resends the
two qubits (1 and 2) to Bob and Charlie. Bob and Charlie perform Cb1 and Cc2 on their
respective qubits. We conclude that Bob and Charlie get correct result.
(4) In the fourth round, Alice, Bob, Charlie and Eve perform a Hadamard gate operation
on their respective qubits. As a result, the state of whole system will be converted into
Eq. (2). In this round, Eve can eavesdrop the key bit of even round without being detected.
Suppose information bit of Alice is q4 = |k¯〉12 (k = 0 or 1), after Alice performed a CNOT
operation Ca1 and sent the two qubits to Bob and Charlie, Eve intercepts the two qubits
and performs a CNOT operation Ce21. The two qubits have disentangled from the carrier.
Eve can perform two single particle measurements on the two qubits (1 and 2) and get the
value of q2 ⊕ q4. Afterward, she prepares two qubits in the state |q2 ⊕ q4〉1′,2′ and performs
CNOT operations Ce21′ , Ce11′ and sends them to Bob and Charlie, respectively. Bob and
Charlie act on their respective qubits by the operations Cb1′ and Cc2′, so they can get the
correct information.
(5) In next odd and even rounds, Eve uses the same strategy in step (3) and (4). So Eve
can get the information ( q1⊕ q3, q1⊕ q5, · · · and q2⊕ q4, q2⊕ q6, · · ·). As long as any odd and
even numbered data bits are announced by Alice, Eve could obtain Alice’s full information.
Comparing with Gao’s strategy [12] our strategy improves the efficiency of eavesdropping.
We can prove that the protocol [11] is insecure by our eavesdropping strategy. So we modify
this protocol [11] as follows:
(1) Alice, Bob and Charlie have shared one three-particle state |χ〉 as carrier (the state
can be expressed as |χ〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 1〉)a,b,c ). The following property will be used:
H ⊗H ⊗H|χ〉 = |G〉 = 1
2
(|0, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 0〉+ |1, 0, 1〉+ |0, 1, 1〉)a,b,c. (4)
(2) Before Alice sends her information qubits to Bob and Charlie, she decides if she
performs a Hadamard gate on her qubit a. If Alice performs a Hadamard gate on her qubit,
she chooses two qubits which are in two-qubit state q → q¯ = |q〉12 = 1√
2
(|0, q〉+ |1, q ⊕ 1〉)
for sending a classical bit. Alice performs one single CNOT gate Ca1 to entangle this state
to the carrier
|ψ〉 = 1
2
{(|0, q〉+ |1, q ⊕ 1〉)⊗ |0, 0〉+ (|0, q〉 − |1, q ⊕ 1〉)⊗ |1, 1〉}a,1,2,b,c, (5)
5and sends the two qubits to Bob and Charlie. After Bob and Charlie have received the two
qubits, Alice informs that she did a Hadamard gate. Then Bob and Charlie also perform a
hadamard gate accordingly. This state of these qubits will be specified by
|ψ〉 = 1
2
{|0, q〉 ⊗ (|0, 0〉+ |1, 1〉) + |1, q + 1〉 ⊗ (|0, 1〉+ |1, 0〉)}a,1,2,b,c. (6)
Bob and Charlie perform two CNOT operations Cb1 and Cc2 on their respective qubits to
disentangle qubits 1 and 2.
(2’) If Alice does’t perform a Hardamard gate on his qubit a, she will choose two single
particles which are in the state |q1〉 and |q2〉 (q1, q2 ∈ (0,1)). The classical bit is the value of
q1 ⊕ q2. Alice performs one CNOT gate Ca1 or Ca2 to entangle one of the two particles to
the carrier. Suppose Alice performs Ca1. The state of these qubits can be expressed as
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
{(|0, 0, 0, q1〉+ |1, 1, 1, q1 ⊕ 1〉)⊗ |q2〉}a,b,c,1,2. (7)
Alice sends the two qubits to Bob and Charlie. After Bob and Charlie have received the two
qubits, Alice informs that she did not perform a Hadamard gate and performed a CNOT
gate Ca1. Then Bob perform Cb1 to disentangle his receiving qubit 1.
(3) Bob and Charlie performs single particle measurement on their respective particles
(1 and 2). Only one of them publicly announces the measurement result, and the other will
add the publicly announced result to his own measurement result to get Alice’s information.
(4) In next round, Alice know the three-particle state is in |χ〉 or |G〉 according to the
number of Hadamard gate she has performed. Alice, Bob and Charlie do similar operations
from step (2) to (4).
(5) At last, Alice publicly announces part of classical bits through a classical channel.
They compare the results and analyze the error rate. If the error rate is reasonably low,
they can believe the security of the process. Otherwise they terminate the QSS and start
next one form step (1).
Now, let us discuss the security of the revised protocol. For convenience, we call Gao’s
attack strategy in [12] A1, and call our attacking strategy A2. Suppose Eve intends to
use A1 to attack. Eve intercepts one of the two qubits 1 after Alice sent the qubits. Eve
prepares a qubit in the state |0〉 as her ancilla e. She performs a CNOT operation C1e. Eve
doesn’t know that the qubits sent by Alice were in single particle state or two-qubit state.
If the qubits sent by Alice are in two-qubit state (i.e., |0〉 ), the state of whole system will
6be converted into
|ψ〉 = 1
2
{|0〉 ⊗ (|0, 0, 0〉+ |1, 1, 1〉)⊗ |0, 0〉+ |1〉 ⊗ (|1, 0, 1〉+ |0, 1, 0〉)⊗ |1, 1〉}a,1,2,e,b,c,. (8)
After Bob and Charlie received Alice’s sending qubits, Alice announces that she performed
a Hadamard gate. Bob and Charlie also perform a Hadamard gate on the qubits b and c.
Then they perform a CNOT operation Cb1 and Cc2 and make a single particle measurement
on their qubits (1 and 2), respectively. The state of these qubits will be converted into one
of the two states:
|ψ〉 =


1
2
(|0, 0, 0, 0〉+ |0, 1, 1, 1〉+ |1, 0, 1, 0〉+ |1, 1, 0, 1〉)a,b,c,e,
1
2
(|0, 0, 0, 1〉+ |0, 1, 1, 0〉+ |1, 0, 1, 1〉+ |1, 1, 0, 0〉)a,b,c,e.
(9)
In next round, when Alice sends single particles as information qubits to Bob and Charlie,
the eavesdropping behavior makes error in comparing the data bits jointly received by Bob
and Charlie with those sent by Alice. If Alice sends single particles as information qubits in
the beginning, Eve performs a CNOT operation C1e on the intercepted qubit and her ancilla.
Eve might entangle his ancilla to the carrier. But in next round Alice doesn’t announce if she
has performed a hadamard gate until Bob and Charlie received her sending qubits. Owing
to Eve doesn’t know how to operate the intercepted qubit, she inevitably introduces error.
So Eve can’t get any useful information and her eavesdropping behavior will be detected by
the legitimate users.
Suppose Eve wants to entangle his ancilla to the carrier by using the method of even
round in A2 to attack. After Alice sent his two information bits to Bob and Charlie, Eve
intercepts the two sending qubits and performs two CNOT operations C1e, C2e on the two
particles and her ancilla. Eve’s aim is to entangle the state of his ancilla to the state |G〉.
When Alice sends single particles as information qubits and performs a CNOT gate Ca1, the
state of whole system can be expressed as
|φ〉 = 1√
2
{(|0, 0, 0, q1, q1 ⊕ q2〉+ |1, 1, 1, q1 ⊕ 1, q1 ⊕ q2 ⊕ 1〉)⊗ |q2〉}a,b,c,1,e,2. (10)
When the two qubits sent by Alice are in two-qubit state, Eve can also entangle her ancilla
to the carrier. Then the state of these qubits can be as follows
|φ′〉 = 1
2
{(|0, 0, 0, q, q〉+ (|1, 1, 0, q ⊕ 1, q⊕ 1〉+ (|1, 0, 1, q ⊕ 1, q⊕ 1〉+ (|0, 1, 1, q, q〉)}a,b,c,1,2,e.
(11)
7When Alice sends his information qubits in next round, Eve can not know these information
qubits of Alice are in single particle state or two qubit-state ahead of time. So Eve should
not decide how to operate and eavesdrop information.
Even if one of the legitimate users (Bob) is dishonest and wants to eavesdrop Alice’s
information by intercept-and-resend attack strategy, he can’t also eavesdrop the information
without being detected. For example, after Alice sent two information qubits, Bob intercepts
the two qubits and sends his qubit 2’ to charlie. Charlie would take the qubit 2’ for Alice’s
qubit 2. If Alice sends two single particles as information qubits and entangles Bob’s qubit 1
to the carrier, she announces her operations after confirming Bob and Charlie have received
their qubits. Then Bob can perform a CNOT gate Cb1 and two single particle measurements
on the qubits 1 and 2. So he can get the value of q1 ⊕ q2. Bob also knows the value of q2′ ,
and then he can announce the value of q1′ according to q1 ⊕ q2 = q1′ ⊕ q2′ . As a result Bob
can get the secret information without being detected. But when Alice entangles Charlie’s
qubit 2 to the carrier, Charlie should perform a CNOT gate Cc2′ and make a measurement
on her receiving qubit 2’. She will get the value of q2′ or q2′ ⊕ 1. Bob can still gain the value
of q1 ⊕ q2 after knowing Alice’s operations. But he can’t know the measurement result of
Charlie is q2′ or q2′ ⊕ 1. This would lead to 50% difference between the bit recovered by
Charlie and the information bit Alice has sent. If Bob intercepts the two qubits which are in
two-qubit state, he can’t get the right information according to Eq (4). His eavesdropping
behavior will be detected by the legitimate users.
In summary, firstly, in our revised QSS protocol the secure carrier can be used repeatedly
to send secret information when there is no presence of Eve. Secondly, Eve can’t eavesdrop
the secret information by entangling her ancilla to the carrier. The dishonest one of the
two legitimate users can’t gain information without being detected. The revised protocol is
unconditionally secure. Thirdly, in the original protocol [11] Alice encodes information bits
as a state |q, q〉 for sending odd bit. Bob and Charlie can recover the information bit without
each other’s assistance. In our protocol, Bob and Charlie must cooperate to gain Alice’s
information in every round. So our protocol improves the efficiency of the secret sharing.
Furthermore, when Alice sends N bits information to Bob and Charlie, they will perform N
Hadamard gates in the original protocol. In our protocol they will perform Hadamard gate
8operation randomly. Our protocol decreases the number of Hadamard gate operations.
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